Showing posts with label Practice Pointers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Practice Pointers. Show all posts

Thursday, January 31, 2013

More on the illegal immigrant and WC benefits


Every litigation attorney develops his theory of the case and keys his presentation of the evidence to that narrative.  Usually one attorney's theory of the case collides with the other side's theory at trial.  This precise phenomenon occurred recently on one of my cases involving a worker who was legitimately injured but was able to return to work.  This worker retained an excellent trial attorney who, in the process of submitting documentation to the State Board regarding his representation, had to let the Court know that his client did not have a valid social security number.   When this information was presented to the employer, the accommodated duty work that the employee was then working had to come to an end.   The employee requested that income benefits be commenced, but the employer declined, pointing out that the proximate cause of the Employee's lack of income was not the restrictions from his injury but the immigration status and the prohibition by the IRCA of 1986 for his continued employment.

Later, counsel for the injured worker requested income benefits when he produced a comprehensive list of employers with whom his client had applied unsuccessfully for work.  Counsel argued that pursuant to the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Maloney v. Gordon County Farms   and its corollary decision Moses v. Diamond Rug Mills he was entitled to income benefits.  For a more complete discussion of these cases, see our previous posts such as http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1133353663305007639#editor/target=post;postID=7848834889193301083
The theories of the case were fully in conflict.  Either this employee was ineligible for benefits because of his status (according to the employer) or he could potentially qualify when he had proven that he performed a diligent and unsuccessful job search thus entitling him to benefits.  Both theories had the support of rulings from the Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court.  Neither, however, could be harmonized with the other.

Maloney and Moses  predate Palacias and Martines and neither anticipated that the injured worker had a legal impediment to the jobs which he might be seeking.   Palacias and Martines, however both anticipated that the injured worker had restrictions which prevented full duty employment. What to do?  The employee has ongoing restrictions and his employer cannot provide him with suitable employment.  His employer won't pay for work not done and the employee either has been refused employment because of his injury or the employee has looked far and wide for a job with no results. Maloney and Moses would require the employer to pay him income benefits as the Administrative Law Judge could find a diligent and sincere effort was made to find a job.  For his part, the employer cannot return the employee to work without violating Federal Immigration laws. Remember, the Court in Martines stated  "Under these circumstances, declaring illegal immigration status to be a basis for justified refusal of employment under OCGA § 34-9-240 would allow an employee already receiving benefits to refuse any proffered employment on the basis of his legal inability to perform the work."

In our case, the State Board declined to reach the question of whether the employee was unable to "meaningfully accept" preferred employment as the job search which he did perform was found to be deficient. Sooner or later, the question will need to be addressed directly.  If the Court's ruling in Martines is any guide, the answer seems likely to be resolved in favor of the Employer.

"Skedsvold, White & Wesley
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Wednesday, January 30, 2013

He's illegal, is he entitled to Comp?

Our post yesterday asked the question whether someone who is illegal/undocumented is entitled to workers compensation benefits.  The quick answer is that illegal/undocumented status, standing alone does nothing to render an injured worker ineligible for medical benefits.  So far so good.  But what about income benefits?  Again, standing alone, the illegal/undocumented status doesn't answer the question and, again, it depends. 

For the sake of this discussion, we will assume that our hypothetical worker sustained a compensable injury and that there are no wilfull misconduct, statute of limitations or other defenses to the claim as a whole.  The question comes down to the injured worker's physical capacity after the injury.  If the injured worker, illegal or otherwise, has no restrictions related to an on the job injury then that worker is not entitled to Temporary Total or Temporary Partial (sometimes known as Indemnity or income) benefits.  If, on the other hand, the injured worker is completely unable to work, then that injured worker, whether legal or illegal, is entitled to Temporary Total Disability Benefits.  The harder question is what does an employer owe to an injured worker who can work within a restricted duty capacity.  Even in this narrow area, IT DEPENDS.  Let us discuss a few permutations:

1) Employer KNOWINGLY hires illegal/undocumentated worker who subsequently has an injury:    The State Board of Workers' Compensation is a court of limited and statutory definition. That means that the SBWC is not a court of equity.  While the SBWC has no powers to mete out fairness, the Board and its judges do have a sense of karma and you can bet your lungs that any employer who hires illegals/undocumenteds in the hopes of saving money on a later worker's compensation claim is in for a most inhospitable reception.  Recommendation?  Don't try that.

2) Employer UNKNOWINGLY hires illegal/undocumented worker who subsequently has an injury.  If the employee is immediately released to return to work with restrictions then the employer has no obligation to immediately commence income benefits if the employer can provide employment suitable to the employee's restricted capacity.  But, if you read yesterday's post or have paid attention to the various iterations of Federal Immigration law, you know that since 1986 Employers may not knowingly hire illegal/undocumented workers.  How then, does this work?  By the way, the cynical among us are already thinking "hey, wait a minute, how is it that yesterday the employer didn't know and today he does?" It's a fair question with a couple of answers.  Either the employer did know (in which case see #1) or something tipped them off.   That something can be a medical report in which the status is mentioned, a  medical bill with N/A listed for the social security number or a notice of representation from an attorney who is prohibited from filing WC claims using a fraudulent social security number.  It does happen that an employer is tipped off after the fact but the Employer better be prepared to prove the sequence of events or that employer will find an unsympathetic ear on the bench.   If the employer really didn't know, and that employer can provide the employee with suitable accomodated duty employment BUT FOR the employee's illegal/undocumented status, then the Employer can successfully assert that the proximate cause of the injured worker's unemployed status is NOT the restrictions from his on the job injury but instead the employee's immigration status. 

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered a situation CLOSE to this in Earth First Grading & Builders Ins. Group/Ass'n Services, Inc. v. Gutierrez. 270 Ga.App. 328, 606 S.E.2d 332
(2004).  In that case though, the Employer tried to argue that the employee's illegal status rendered him ineligible for income benefits by virtue of IRCA of 1986.  You will recall that the Georgia Supreme Court already rejected that argument in the Continental Pet v. Palacias decision earlier in 2004.  The Employer argued though that Mr. Gutierrez was ineligble for the income benefits since his illegal status rendered him unable to "meaningfully accept" any employment.  That argument gets close to the heart of the matter but, unfortunately the Court declined to reach that issue as the Court pointed out that the Employer did not even know if the illegal status until long after the period for which Mr. Gutierrez was seeking benefits. 

The next closest decision on the question came 2 years later in the case of Martines v. Worley & Sons Const., 278 Ga.App. 26, 628 S.E.2d 113 (2006).  In Martines, the Employee sustained a compensable injury and income benefits were paid to him.  The Employer wanted to suspend his income benefits by returning him to work.  The Court's opinin recounts:  "His employer offered him a position as a delivery truck driver, a job falling within the restrictions set by his physician. He agreed to accept the job, and reported to work. Before allowing him to drive a company truck, however, his employer asked him to show a driver's license and documentation that he was in the country legally. At that time, he revealed that he could not produce a Georgia driver's license and could not obtain one because, as all parties concede, he entered this country illegally.  No evidence was presented that he is unable to drive for any physical or health-related reason or that he does not possess the ability to operate the vehicle."  The Employer followed the statute and the rules in tendering the job to the employee and the Employee could not produce the required documentation or driver's license. What then to do?  The Court cited its decision in Gutierrez, especially the "meaningfully accept" language and decided that Mr. Martines was not entitled to a continuation of his income benefits.  The Court held  "Under these circumstances, declaring illegal immigration status to be a basis for justified refusal of employment under OCGA § 34-9-240 would allow an employee already receiving benefits to refuse any proffered employment on the basis of his legal inability to perform the work. "

Notice here, that the Court gave neither side a get out of jail free card.  It did not leave the injured worker unprotected by holding him forever and ever ineligible for income benefits.  Neither did the Court provide a free pass to some unscrupulous employer in search of low cost and disposable employees. 

Bottom line:  Employer's do your homework and get the documentation for your employees BEFORE you hire them.  Get the required I-9 form and photo Identification and maintain the records.  If possible, use the E-Verify System.  Whatever you do, standardize your practice, keep the records and treat your employees fairly.  Another important tip not discussed , but assumed,  in these cases is to keep control of the medical treatment.  Georgia law provides for Employer control of medical if the Panel of Physicians is properly composed, properly posted and properly explained to the employees.  Had the Employers in Gutierrez or Martines not provided medical care to the workers, these employers might have had less opportunity to consider accomodated duty as the employee's choice of physician might very well have been less receptive to the concept. 

Next up:  What happens when Martines v. Worley & Sons collides with Maloney v. Gordon County Farms and its allowance for an injured worker to get back on income benefits if he is unable to find employment suitable to his restrictions. 


"Skedsvold, White & Wesley
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Tuesday, January 29, 2013

My Injured worker is an illegal alien. Do I have to pay him?

The title may sound harsh or deliberately charged so, stated another way, My injured worker is undocumented.  Do I have to pay him?    Well, as with most answers that you will get from an attorney, "it depends." 

First and foremost, ANY worker that you have in your employ that is injured in an accident arising out of an occurring in the course of his employ is entitled to medical treatment for his COMPENSABLE injuries.  That is not to say that claims of injury for which you have an otherwise viable defense are treated any differently.  On the contrary, Georgia law is perfectly clear on this point that based upon that person's presence and employment in Georgia, he is entitled to the equal protection of its laws.    That much was settled in 1993 in the case of Barge-Wagener Const. Co. v. Morales, 263 Ga. 190, 429 S.E.2d 671 (1993).  In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act concerning payments made to dependents of workers who died as a result of compensable injuries in Georgia.  The statutory provision in question provided for lesser benefits to surviving dependents who did not reside in the United States.  Citing a decision from Florida, the Court held:
 
'[W]e do not perceive this case as hinging on the constitutional rights of the surviving dependents, but on the constitutional rights of the worker, now deceased.... This case concerns whether a worker who happens to have dependents residing out of the country is entitled to the same fruits of his or her labor as any other worker, including the same insurance benefits where the state has required those benefits to be provided. It thus is immaterial that petitioners happen to be nonresident aliens, since they have standing in this context as his beneficiaries.'

We should reach the same conclusion here in Georgia because, as was the case in Florida, the benefits in question were generated by the employee's labor and flowed through him to the intended beneficiaries, his dependents. We should recognize their standing to enforce the rights which Mr. Morales earned by his labor while resident in this country.
 
The bottom line is that the injured worker's presence in the United States that confers upon him  the right to enforce benefits for a compensable under Georgia Law.  Morales  extended standing to enforce rights conferred by Georgia Law to his surviving dependents, .  As well it should.   Employers should be encouraged and required to follow both Federal Immigration law and Georgia Workers' Compensation law by endeavoring to hire those eligible to work while at the same time protecting everyone they do hire.

In 2004, another run was made at the idea of disqualifying illegal/undocumented from the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act  in the case of Continental PET Technologies, Inc. v. Palacias, 269 Ga.App. 561, 604 S.E.2d 627 (2004).  In Palacias, the employer pointed to the requirements of the last great immigration solution, the Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) in support of its position that the injury should not be covered.  Citing IRCA, the employer argued that Federal law prevented the knowing hire of illegal aliens/undocumented immigrants and prohibited the use of fraudulent documents to obtain employment.   The Employer argued that the terms of IRCA would preempt state law and thus render Ms. Palacias ineligible for employment and, by extension, workers' compensation benefits.  The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the preemption challenge holding that IRCA was not intended to preempt state workers' compensation laws.    This holding was in line with decisions in other states such as Florida and Minnesota. 

The Employer's next argument was that Ms. Palacias perpetrated a fraud in presenting fake documents to get hired and that her fraud voided the employment contract from the beginning.  In essence the employer wanted the court to hold that Ms. Palacias was not an employee and, therefore not subject to coverage under the workers compensation act.  The Court rejected that argument holding that there was no causal connection between the misrepresentations and the injury. 

The Georgia Court rulings make sense when one considers not only the law, but also when one considers the implications of a different finding.  Were employers able to claim that compensation for medical treatment for an otherwise compensable injury can be denied with impunity if the injured worker happens to be illegal/undocumented, the incentives would then be for the employer to hire such illegal/undocumented workers and to treat them as a disposable commodity.  The problem would then NOT be solved,  but magnified. 

What about INCOME benefits though?  More on that tomorrow....


"Skedsvold, White & Wesley
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Sunday, January 20, 2013

Actual questions from a Deposition

Yes, this is an actual exchange from a Deposition that I took a couple of years ago:

Q:  I need to ask you about your criminal history.  Have you ever been arrested?

A:  Yes.

Q:  Okay, please tell me about it.

A:  Well, I had to feed my children.

Q:  What did you steal?

A:  A curling iron.

[?!  Martha Stewart pay attention, this is probably how cooking creme brûlée with a blow torch started out.]



"Skedsvold & White
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Friday, January 18, 2013

The Limits of Workers Compensation

In a January 15, 2013 post on www.InsuranceJournal.com there is a cursory mention of proposed legislation in Connecticut that would require coverage for PTSD to help first responders.  The need for such legislation, was suggested by the Newtown Board of Police Commissioners to help those suffering physical and emotional trauma "as a consequence of their heroic efforts" on the job.  By implication, this suggests that the current law in Connecticut does not, for one reason or another already provide for necessary protection for psychiatric problems or disability occasioned by on the job exposures.   Before rushing headlong into legislation to cover this or that condition, I wonder if any thought is given as to WHY current law does not cover it or the implications of the change.

Please do not misunderstand, I do not know what Connecticut law is and have  no familiarity with it to offer any criticism of the current law or the wisdom of seeking to change it.  My point is a larger one:  workers' compensation is a blunt instrument and not one well-suited for tailor-made solutions while running from one high profile crisis to another.  It seems that legislators are genetically predisposed towards the mindset that "there should be a law."  Less thought is given though as to the implications or the expense when a few extra lines are added to the State Labor and Industrial Relations act.  

What, might you ask, is the harm in providing protection when the need is so clearly demonstrated?  Well, consider that psychiatric disability is so poorly understood that the legal system is ill equipped to handle it.  If two medical experts can look at the same MRI and come to two different conclusions, can we hope for certainty or objectivity when there is no picture, no diagnostic test that all can see to demonstrate that this person has it and that one doesn't?    I am in no way suggesting that PTSD is not real, that depression is not disabling or that on-the-job exposures might lead to them.  I only suggest that they are so poorly understood that a little legislative humility might be in order and that maybe, just maybe, the workers' compensation system is not the best forum or the only forum in which these policy judgments can be worked out. 

As a statutory system, workers' compensation is designed to be applied by the numbers, by the book.  Each State Constitution has as its foundational principle that all of its citizens must be given equal protection under the law.  Can we truly say that is happening when a police officer or EMT is given treatment for PTSD after this horrific event in Newtown, Connecticutt but an officer who responds to a domestic abuse call or child abuse investigation is not?   The statute in question here will undoubtedly include both going forward and probably for the good.  However, in the rush to get this bill passed, is the larger tapestry of the workers' compensation system considered?  Is any consideration given as to why the system did not include this in the past?  There might be some wisdom in the existing system that gets lost when a high profile event drives our emotions out in front of reason.  I do not mean to suggest that this is the case with the bill in question but I would hope that legislators are mindful of the concept.

Many of us remember the horrible days of 9/11/2001 and were all caught up in the emotional rollercoaster that started that morning.  The outpouring of support both public and private was the least that those of us not directly involved in rescue, recovery and later salvage operations could do.  Each of the workers involved in those events will carry the scars and the honor of having been there and having performed so selflessly in circumstances which most of us can scarcely imagine.  Like them, the first responders in Newtown, have the thanks of a grateful nation for what they had to endure.    The question remains though, is the workers' compensation system the only forum or the best forum to express that gratitude?   Is a police offer responding to a single shooting of an adult any less traumatized by the event?  If PTSD was not considered an appropriate stand-alone diagnosis and the basis of a compensable workers' compensation claim in the past, is it just the agony of seeing the slaughter of innocents that compels the change?  Remember, the legislative change will apply to all going forward and we need to understand that once this pandora's box is opened cannot thereafter be closed to others deserving or otherwise.  How long will it take before this PTSD is applied to a termination for cause or to an unpleasant interaction between co-employees in which the business played no part? 

In 1996 floodwaters wreaked havoc in Albany, Georgia.  As sometimes happens in low lying and flood prone areas, caskets from a local cemetary worked their way up and into the floodwaters.  An employee of the city was given the unenviable task of retrieving the caskets and the bodies from the waters.  The effort left this poor man scarred.  His workers' compensation claim was, however, denied since he suffered no physical injury and instead soley psychic trauma.  Georgia's statutes do not provide for purely psychic trauma claims but do allow for psychiatric treatment when a physical injury is involved.    The Georgia Supreme Court declined to create a pure psychic trauma category even in this example when problems would be understandable, opting instead to leave that to the legislature.  Was the Court harsh?  Was the Workers' Compensation system or the Employer and its Insurer uncaring simply because the workers compensation system was not the proper forum?  What was lacking from the Supreme Court's opinion was the rest of the story.  As often happens, the full picture provides not only context but explanation and in some cases justification.  The Trial Judge in this case explained that psychiatric treatment was offered to this worker but as part of the Employer's Employee Assistance Program, outside of the Workers' Compensation system.  Was the employer less compassionate by providing that treatment outside of a system designed more for physical injuries and their treatment?  Sometimes, there is no appropriate remedy.  Sometimes the remedy lies elsewhere.   Workers' Compensation should not be the repository for every potential encounter, every potential injury.  It is still a statutory system that, if held to the language of the statute can be used to effecuate the purposes of the act but only if the respective legislatures act with deliberation, after due consideration of the practical consequences of their actions. 


"Skedsvold & White
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Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Fictional Accident DENIED

In our discussions of New Accident versus Change of condition, we have tried to distinguish between the two. A recent case from the Georgia Court of Appeals highlights the fact that the concept of a "new accident" needs some attention as well. In JMJ Plumbing v. Cudihy (Ga. Ct. App. A12A1348, 11/30/2012) the Court was presented with an appeal by an Employer that won its case at the State Board's Appellate Division only to have the Superior Court reverse. First, anytime you have that situation arise, the Superior Court's ruling is in jeopardy if there is ANY evidence to support the finding of the SBWC. In short, all the Superior Court can do is to see if the correct legal standard was applied. If so, the award should be affirmed even if the Superior Court disagrees with the facts. As to the issues in Mr. Cudihy's claims, the Court of Appeals found that the SBWC had applied the correct standard and reversed the Superior Court. Claim denied. So, now that you know the result, what happened? Mr. Cudihy was a plumber who on 9/2/2008 alleged that he felt a sharp pain in his back while digging in the course of his employ. The problem is that he did not report the injury to his employer but did seek medical treatment after work. During that visit, though, he mentioned that he developed back pain over the weekend and experienced pain that morning while digging. His next medical treatment was in 1/2009 and then in 3/2009 when he sought chiropractic care. He saw an orthopedist in May and June 2009 and was told that he should work at light duty and that surgery might be warranted. The injury was first reported to his employer on 6/25/2009. He worked light duty until terminated for reasons unrelated to his injury (the Court does not elaborate and there is apparently no dispute that the termination was in fact unrelated) in August 2009. Mr. Cudihy applied for WC benefits and alleged a 6/25/2009 injury date. The Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant had sustained in injury on 9/2/08 and a new accident on 6/25/09 and was entitled to TTD and medical treatment. The new accident date of 6/25/09 was supposely based upon the 1978 decision of the Court of Appeals in Central State Hospital v. James and relates to the situation in which the employee is injured but "continues to work until he is forced to cease work because of his gradullay worsening condition which was at least partly attributable to his physical activity in continuing to work subsequent to his injury..." On Appeal to the Appellate Division of the SBWC, the AD found that Mr. Cudihy did not establish the first accident (9/2/2008) thus making the fictional new injury inapplicable. Remember, Cudihy failed to give notice of the injury within 30 days of 9/2/2008. Further, since 6/25/2009 was not a date of disability, the very terms of the "new accident" as expressed by Central State v. James was inapplicable. Mr. Cudihy only reported the original injury (9/2/2008) on that date. He did not lose time, he continued to work until terminated for other reasons. When he left work, he was admittedly capable of continuing to work. So why did the Superior Court reverse? After all, it seems like the SBWC applied the law correctly. The Superior Court looked to the claimant's continued employment and worsening condition, calling it a cumulative trauma condition that amounted to a gradual injury. The problem with this analysis is that even Mr. Cudihy admitted that he did not sustain any injury on 6/25/2009, he did not become disabled on 6/25/2009 and continued working until he was fired on 8/12/2009 and even after that admits he was capable of continuing to work. The Court of Appeals also noted that there was some evidence that Mr. Cudihy's condition on the date of the original hearing was the same as it was on 9/2/2008 so a finding of worsening was not demanded. Bottom line for Mr. Cudihy and his employer, all claims were denied. Practice Pointers: 1) For the injured worker - report your injury, treat with authorized doctors and work with your employer about accomodated duty 2) For the Employer - don't count on the fact that ACTUAL notice will be required to carry the day. Constructive notice "the employer should have known" will often suffice and is most often available (i.e. the supervisor knew the claimant was in pain, saw indications of pain behavior, claimant missed time for doctor appts, cl was not able to perform as well as had previously been the case) 3) For the Insurer - know the facts about the original injury and make sure that the employee's statements (most helpful if part of a recorded statement) comport with the medical evidence. Interview and be appropriately skeptical of anything told to you, even by the Employer and witnesses, to make sure that these statements are consistent with the record in front of you.


"Skedsvold & White
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Wednesday, November 28, 2012

More on "damned lawyers"

In our post of 11/25/2012, we considered the reactions of the employer when the injured worker gets an attorney. In that short video, we discussed the reasons why the injured worker gets an attorney. Recently,the Workers Compensation Research Institute surveyed injured workers as to why they retained attorneys. The summary of that study is found in an article written by Richard A. Victor, the Executive Director of the WCRI and can be seen at: http://www3.cfo.com/article/2012/11/risk-management_wcri-workers-comp-claims-legal-wcri At least according to the summary by Mr. Victor, there really is no common theme as to why an injured worker feels the need to get an attorney. Employees of do smaller companies seem less likely to consult an attorney while injured workers speaking a different language more likely. What does seem apparent is that Employers are failing to manage the expectations of the injured employee, leaving them in the dark about the claims process, medical treatment and, in some instances, lost wage benefits. This was precisely the point of our post of 11/25/2012 that Employers have the first and best opportunity to set the tone of the claim. The employer should, well in advance of any claim, explain the work comp process and then keep the communication open during and after claims. As we explained, convince an employee that he needs someone to watch his back, pretty soon you will need the same.


"Skedsvold & White
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Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Travelling Employees

When is a travelling Employee not a "travelling employee?" According to the Georgia Court of Appeals, when the employee has not yet reached his destination. In a decision handed down on 11/21/2012, the Court decided the companion cases of THE MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. Hernandez et al. (Ga Ct Appeals A12A1292) and HERNANDEZ et al. v. ATLANTA DRYWALL, LLC. (A12A1315). Both cases arose out of the unfortunate death of Juan Alvarez-Hilario and the serious injuries to Celvin Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Alvarez-Hilario were employed by Atlanta Drywall on a church construction project near Columbus, Ga. In the course of their work on the project, Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Alvarez-Hilario would make the four hour drive from Savannah to Columbus in the early morning hours on Monday, would work 10 hour days, stay in a hotel room provided by the general contractor and then return home on Saturday to spend the weekend at home. They were paid only for the hours during which they were working on the job site, were not paid for the travel time to or from Columbus. On Monday morning 2/8/2010 when they were approximately 5 minutes from the job site, Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Alvarez-Hilario were involved in a motor vehicle accident when their truck overturned. Mr. Alvarez-Hilario died in the accident while Mr. Hernandez was hospitalized for weeks with serious injuries. Both claims were denied by the State Board of Worker's Compensation and that decision was appealed to and affirmed by the State Board's Appellate Division and the Superior Court on Appeal. The Court of Appeals accepted the Application for Discretionary Review to decide whether this case was properly viewed as one involving "travelling employees" or the "going to and from work rule." The distinction between the two is significant. It is axiomatic in Ga workers' compensation law that an injury, to be compensable must "arise out of" and occur "in the course of" the employee's job. "Arising out of" refers to what the employee is doing while "in the course of" looks to when and where the employee was doing it. The "Going to and from work" rule addresses the "in the course of" employment portion of the compensability test and provides that an employee's injuries occurring during that period of time when he is going to and from work (his commute time) is NOT compensable. Over the years, the Courts have carved out exceptions to this rule such as for travelling employees. In the case of travelling employees, the Courts have recognized that an employee, being called away from his home in service of his employer has a wider definition of what would constitute "in the course of" his employment. This has, for example rendered compensable injuries that occur in an employee's hotel room and while the employee is eating. Such activities if performed in a reasonable and prudent manner for the health and comfort of the employee would be considered as arising out of and occuring in the course of his employment. The employee in these circumstances is generally considered as being engaged in "continuous employment." At first blush, then, it might seem that Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Alvarez-Hilario would qualify as travelling employees. Why then did the State Board, the Superior Court and, in this decision, the Court of Appeals decide that the injuries to one and the death of the other were NOT compensable? The distinction lies in the facts as set forth above. These gentelmen would drive from Savannah to Columbus each Monday morning and go straight to work. At the end of their workday, they would retire to the Employer-provided hotel accomodations. By driving to the job site each Monday morning and beginning their workday there, what might have otherwise qualified as "continuous employment" was simply a longer commute and there was no way around the fact that they were "Going TO" work, had not commenced their workday and were not being paid until they arrived at the job site. The Court did take pains to note that "once they had arrived at the job site and begun their duties for the week, barring some deviation for a personal mission wholly foreigh to their employment, the continuious employment doctrine very well might have been applicable..." What factors then were important to consider? 1) These men were NOT being paid for their travel time to and from the job site - they were only "on the clock" when they were at the jobsite. 2) They travelled direct from home to the job site and not to the hotel. One might wonder whether simply driving to the hotel first and then proceeding to the jobsite would have invoked the Continuous employment doctrine. Previous cases have found compensable those injuries which occured between the hotel and the jobsite but all involved a previous overnight stay. In the circumstances of this case, however, when the pay did not begin until they arrived at the jobsite simply "touching base" at the hotel would not seem to be enough.


"Skedsvold & White
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Wednesday, November 21, 2012

Basic Procedures Explained

GEORGIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

Explanation of Basic Procedures

A. Initiating Claim

1. Accident must arise out of, and in the course of, employment. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1).
a. "Arising out of" means what the Employee/Claimant is doing is related to work;

b. "In the course of" means when the Employee/Claimant is where he is expected or supposed to be;

c. Individual must be employee, not independent contractor. (Note: Employees of subcontractors may be covered).

2. Notice -- Employee/Claimant must tell the Employer of incident/accident as soon as practicable after the injury. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-80).

a. If no verbal report of an accident or injury is given to an Employer within thirty (30) days, written notice must be given. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-80; 34-9-81).

b. If no verbal or written notice is given, the Employee/Claimant is barred from receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

c. Employee can be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits if the Employer was aware of the accident.

d. "Constructive notice" -- if the Employer should have known (by the Employee/Claimant’s absence, wearing braces or bandages, or by behavior such as showing pain or limping).

e. Notice to the Employer = Notice to the Insurer. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-123).

3. Filing of claim -- Claim must be filed by Employee/Claimant within one (1) year of the injury date, disability date or last remedial treatment provided by Employer. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82).

a. If Employer does not have a posted Panel of Physicians, any medical treatment the Employee/Claimant obtains will be deemed to have been provided by the Employer;

b. Employee/Claimant may "file" claim by filing form WC-14 with State Board of Workers’ Compensation.

4. Investigation of claim -- the Employer has twenty-one (21) days from date of knowledge of a claim to pay benefits or to controvert (deny) claim (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(b)). Options:

a. Accept claim by paying income benefits and paying on weekly basis;

b. Deny claim by stating reasons for denial on either subsection "C" of WC-1 or WC-3, filing denial with State Board of Workers’ Compensation and sending copy to all parties and medical providers who have treated the Employee/Claimant. (Board Rule 61(b)(4)).

5. Medical Only Claims -- Payment of medical bills is not equivalent to accepting claim. It may, however, extend statute of limitations.



B. Insurance Coverage



1. The Employer, with three (3) or more employees, has the obligation to insure payment of benefits by either obtaining insurance or qualifying with State Board of Workers’ Compensation as self-insured. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-121; 34-9-127).

2. Employment -- If the individual is your employee (including casual employees or "day labor), and not an independent contractor, then he/she is a covered Employee. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(3)).

a. Does not apply to legitimate independent contractors. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(e)(1-3)).

b. Corporate officers may "opt out" of coverage as Employee. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.1).

c. Partners and sole proprietors must "opt in" to be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.2).

3. Statutory employment -- Subcontractors’ employees (not the subcontractor himself unless he has "opted in" under his own coverage) may be covered employees if engaged in same subject matter of contract as your company and if the injury occurs on premises controlled by you or on which you are working (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8).

a. "Premises" of employment may include public roadways if the work involves transportation;
b. "Premises" would not include subcontractor’s own shop.

C. Evaluating Compensability

1. Notice -- Did Employee/Claimant provide actual notice or should Employer have known that a compensable injury or accident occurred (constructive notice)?

2. Does Employer agree that injury arose out of and in the course of Employee/Claimant’s employment with that employer?

3. Is there any reason why income benefits and medical should not be paid?
a. The Employee/Claimant failed drug test. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17);
b. The Employee/Claimant was Injured while involved in horseplay or fight unrelated to work. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1);
c. The Employee/Claimant made a significant misrepresentation of pre-injury condition. (e.g., lying about prior back injuries and this claim is for a back injury);
d. The Employee/Claimant was going to or from work in personal vehicle when accident occurred;
e. Injury was personal to Employee/Claimant (idiopathic – e.g., employee fainted and fainting was not caused by work strain or injury made worse by work conditions). (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4)).

4. Repetitive motion injuries are compensable under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act and are treated as continuous trauma injuries. Date of accident can be either the date the Employee/Claimant seeks medical treatment or the first date of disability. This rule is primarily applicable in carpal tunnel and tendonitis type claims.

5. Occupational disease -- A disease which arises from exposure at work In order to be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, the Employee/Claimant must prove the following pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-280:

a. Direct causal connection between the Employee/Claimant’s work activities and the claimed disease;
b. The disease in question must follow as natural exposure as part of Employee/Claimant’s work;
c. The claimed disease is not something Employee/Claimant would have received substantial exposure to outside of work;
d. The general public is not exposed to the claimed disease as an ordinary disease of life; and
e. The disease in question has its origins at Employee/Claimant’s work.

6. Hernia -- The Employee/Claimant must prove all of the following (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-266):
a. Sudden injury resulting in hernia;
b. Hernia appeared suddenly;
c. Hernia was accompanied by pain;
d. Hernia Immediately followed accident;
e. Hernia did not exist before accident.

7. Psychiatric claims -- Must accompany a physical injury. No "stress" claims.

D. Payment of Income benefits
1. Pay income benefits within twenty-one (21) days and file WC-1 with subsection "B" completed (or WC-2) within twenty-one (21) days (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(b)).

2. Amount of compensation -- 2/3 of average weekly wage up to maximum amounts:
a. Temporary total -- if totally disabled;
b. Temporary partial -- if partially disabled (compare pre-injury wage with post-injury wage and pay 2/3 of difference up to maximum - currently $500.00).

3. Calculating average weekly wage -- The Employer must provide information as soon as possible on gross wages, including tips and other benefits.
a. Thirteen (13) weeks of wages immediately preceding injury (averaged out then multiplied by 2/3 and compared to maximum). (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260(1)).
b. If Employee/Claimant did not work substantially the whole of thirteen (13) weeks, is there a similar employee who did so (i.e., someone doing the same job and earning same wage rate)? If so, use similar employee wages to determine average weekly wage. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260(2)).
c. If wages for a similarly situated employee are unavailable, use contract rate (hours per week employee was hired for multiplied by hourly rate). (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260(3)). (Note: This is assumed to be 40 hours unless contrary appears. Board Rule 260).


E. Denying claim

1. Insurer files form WC-1 subsection "C" or WC-3 with State Board of Workers’ Compensation stating reasons why income benefits and/or medical will not be paid. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(d)).

 2. Medical only claims -- Where no income benefits have been paid, claim has not been accepted as compensable. Payment of medical here can be considered a gratuity.

 3. Changing your mind -- If income benefits are being paid, insurer can controvert within sixty (60) days of first income benefits payment. Must first pay all benefits due before controvert. May deny claim after paying more than sixty (60) days only if denial is based upon newly discovered evidence. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(h)).

F. Payment of Medical

1. Employer/Insurer are liable for medical costs for all procedures designed to effect a cure, provide relief or restore the Employee/Claimant to gainful employment. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a)).

2. Who treats the employee -- Employer must maintain a list of physicians (Panel of Physicians) at work in a place accessible to employees. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(b)).
a. List must contain:
    1. One orthopedist;
    2. One minority (of any speciality and can be orthopedist);
    3. No more than two (2) industrial clinics;
    4. Must have at least six (6) different groups. (physicians practicing as part of the same firm or practice group count as one)
    5. Hospitals cannot be an authorized treating physician and should be used only in emergency situations. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(b)(1)).

b. Instead of Standard Panel of Physicians, an Employer can utilize the following other Panel of Physician forms:
    1. Workers’ Compensation Managed Care Organization (WC/MCO) but must post P3 Panel of Physicians advising Employees that they are covered by WC/MCO. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(b)(3));
   2. Conformed Panel of Physicians -- list of at least ten (10) separate medical providers or groups of providers. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(b)(2)).

c. Advising employees of panel
   1. Employer must make sure that Employee/Claimants understand Panel of Physicians; and
   2. Employee/Claimants are given appropriate assistance in contacting medical provider or physician. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(c)).

d. Utilizing Panel of Physicians:
   1. Make sure to instruct and educate employees regarding use and function of Panel of Physicians when hired, periodically before and injury and whenever an alleged injury is reported to the Employer;
   2. Allow Employee/Claimant to choose any medical provider from Panel of Physicians. Let the Employee/Claimant make the choice regarding treating physician. Do not direct the Employee/Claimant to a particular provider or make this choice for him or her.
   3. If necessary, help arrange or take Employee/Claimant to physician;
   4. Advise Employee/Claimant that expenses incurred with physicians not on the Panel of Physicians will not be paid by the Employer/Insurer.
    5. Advise Employee/Claimant to go to hospital/medical center in an emergency. (This usually is an issue when an accident occurs on a late night shift. Further instruct the Employee/Claimant that once the "emergency" is over, he/she must return to an authorized panel physician;
   6. If Employee/Claimant does not like the first physician, he chose from the Panel of Physicians, he can choose another one on the Panel. All other changes must be approved by the Employer/Insurer or ordered by the State Board of Workers’ Compensation;
   7. Primary Authorized Treating Physicians may arrange for referral to another physician or provider for specialized care (i.e. Authorized Referral); however, this authorized referral physician (one who receives referral) may not arrange for other referrals. The Employer/Insurer are further not responsible for expenses incurred by the Employee/Claimant with physicians other than the Primary Authorized Treating Physician and his referrals.

(Note: recommend using a written acknowledgment form, signed by Employee/Claimant and placed in personnel file.)

3. Bill of Rights -- Workers’ Compensation bill of rights must be posted to explain rights and responsibilities of Employer and Employee/Claimant. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-81.1).

e. Timing for payment of medical - Medical bills must be paid by Employer/Insurer within 30 days - Medical provider must provide, free of charge, copy of record, office note, admission summary, discharge summary, or diagnostic treatment results (any record supporting the bill) along with the WC20, UB92 or HCFA 1500 form.

f. Mileage Reimbursement - Paid to the Employee/Claimant upon submission of mileage showing date incurred, medical provider seen and amount of round-trip miles. Must be paid by Employer/Insurer within 30 days at $.28 per mile.

G. Suspension of Income Benefits

1. Actual return to work -- Employer/Insurer may suspend immediately upon return to work.
    a. No restrictions -- If Employee/Claimant has no restrictions, no temporary total or temporary partial benefits are due;
   b. Restrictions -- Compare pre-injury average weekly wage with post-return to work wages and pay 2/3 of difference up to maximum Temporary Partial Disability Benefits rate. No benefits are owed to the Employee/Claimant if he/she returns to work with medical restrictions but at his/her pre-injury average weekly wage rate of higher.

2. Release to return to work without restrictions and without actual return to work.
   a. Insurer files form WC-2 with State Board of Workers’ Compensation (attaching normal duty release from authorized treating physician). (Board Rule 221(i)(4)).
   b. Insurer pays additional ten (10) days of benefits from date WC-2 was filed with the Board and notice was provided to the Employee/Claimant regarding suspension of benefits. (Rule 221(1)(1)).

3. Release to return to work with restrictions (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221; 34-9-240).
   a. No automatic suspension of benefits;
   b. Employer provides suitable light duty work to Employee/Claimant (restricted duty employment);

       1. Provide job description to treating physician for approval. (Employer/Insurer or their Counsel must send a copy of the job description to the Employee/Claimant at same time it is sent to treating physician);

      2. If job description is approved by Employee/Claimant’s authorized treating physician, offer job to Employee/Claimant by using form WC-240.

4. WC-240 Return to Work Offer (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240)
   a. Serve WC-240 with job description and authorized treating physicians approval attached to Employee/Claimant and his Counsel at least ten (10) days before return to work date;
   b. File copy of WC-240 to State Board of Workers’ Compensation;
   c. Refusal of Claimant to Return to Work -- If Employee/Claimant does not return to work on date and time shown on WC-240, suspend income benefits by filing WC-2 (with WC-240 attached) with State Board of Workers’ Compensation;
   d. Attempt by Claimant to Return to Work -- Employee/Claimant may try to perform light duty job for up to fifteen (15) business days to see if suitable. If, for any reason, employee does not perform job position for fifteen (15) days, the Insurer must recommence payment of appropriate income benefits to Employee/Claimant;

    e. Insincere Effort by Claimant to Perform Light Duty Work -- After recommencing payment of appropriate income benefits to Employee/Claimant, the Employer/Insurer may request a hearing to suspend Employee/Claimant’s benefits.

   f. Illegal Aliens - If Employee/Claimant is already receiving income benefits, use WC240 to offer Employee/Claimant’s job description approved by the treating physician and require the Employee/Claimant to prove lawful employability status prior to allowing him/her to return to work with the Employer. The Employer/Insurer may unilaterally suspend payment of income benefits per the WC240 when the Employee/Claimant cannot verify legal eligibility to work in U.S.



Permanent Disability (Impairment) Ratings and Payment of Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) Benefits
34-9-263 PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY ("PPD")



(Sometimes referred to as "impairment rating").

Based upon reading given by Authorized Treating Physician in accordance with current AMA Guidelines. Dollar value based upon formula:

Number of weeks shown in 34-9-263 x % rating = Number of weeks PPD is to be paid.



Number of weeks to be paid x TTD rate =Total PPD entitlement.



Number of Maximum Weeks Per Body Part Loss:



Body Part Maximum Weeks Body Part Maximum Weeks
Arm 225                                                             
Leg 225
Hand 160
Great Toe 30
Any Toe other than the great toe 20
Foot 135
Loss of hearing, traumatic One ear 75
Both ears 150
Thumb 60
Middle Finger 35
Ring Finger 30
Index Finger 40
Little Finger 25
Loss of vision of one eye 150
Disability to the body as a whole 300

1. A Permanent Impairment Rating is based upon permanent impairment from injury.

2. Permanent Impairment Rating must be issued/approved by authorized treating physician for the Employee/Claimant based upon American Medical Associations’ Guide to Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition. (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263(d)).

3. Formula for payments -- Percentage rating is multiplied by number of weeks provided in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 (see chart below); result is the number of weeks PPD benefits are to be paid to Employee/Claimant. The Employer/Insurer are then required to pay PPD benefits at his Temporary Total Disability Benefits rate for the number of week specified. These PPD benefits can be paid over time or in lump sum according to Employer/Insurer’s desire on the subject.


I. Settlements

 1. Permitted but not required by State Board of Workers’ Compensation.
 2. Must pay Employee/Claimant more than that to which he/she is already entitled.
 3. May close medical after a certain, defined period after settlement approval or, in limited circumstances, upon approval of settlement.
 4. The Employer may require employee to resign as a condition of settlement, but the agreement to resign cannot be contained in settlement agreement and stipulation submitted to Board for approval.J. Board Forms (of significance to employers) -- The form number is located at the bottom of the page, centered and in bold type.

1. WC-1 -- First Report of Injury
a. Must be completed by Employer immediately upon knowledge of injury (Rule 61(b)(1));
b. Must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of disability (Rule 61(b)(1);
c. Form itself is not evidence. May not be used as evidence at any hearing.

2. WC-6 -- Wage Statement -- Used in calculating average weekly wage for payment of TTD, TPD and PPD.
a. Recommend completion on every claim;
b. Reflects Employee/Claimant’s Gross wages for thirteen (13) weeks prior to injury.

3. WC-14 -- Notice of Claim/Request for Hearing
a. If "Notice of Claim" box is checked, no action is required;
If "Request for Hearing" box is checked, the Employer should immediately notify the Insurer. The Employee/Claimant has requested a hearing on the issues listed on the back of the form. This form is also commonly accompanied with written discovery including interrogatories, requests for production and requests for admissions. Provide these items to the Insurer and your legal counsel as soon as possible.

4. WCP1, P2, P3 -- Panel of Physicians

a. Form is generally provided to the Employer by the Insurer;
b. Post in a conspicuous location (i.e., Employee break room, next to time clock, etc.);
c. Tell Employee/Claimant about panel and, if possible, have him/her sign acknowledgment form.

5. WC-102 -- Request for Production of Documents
a. Unlike other written discovery, a hearing is not required for a party to file and serve a WC-102 on opposing party.
b. Must provide documents requested within thirty (30) days or likely be penalized with assessed attorney’s fees;
c. If Insurer is to respond to WC-102, the Employer must documents pertinent to the items requested in the WC-102 to the Insurer as soon as possible.

6. WC-102(g) -- Motion Form
a. Object or Purpose of motion will be listed on form;
b. A party must respond to any motion filed on WC-102d within fifteen (15) days of date printed on certificate of service;
c. An Employer must advise Insurer and/or legal counsel of receipt of motion immediately upon receipt.

7. WC-200(a) -- Change of Physicians by Consent -- use when Employer and Insurer have agreed with Employee/Claimant to effect a change in medical treatment to a provider not listed on the Panel of Physicians or to reflect a change to a different provider on the panel once the Claimant has exercised his one "free" physician change pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201.  (Beware of the WC200a coming from an attorney suggesting a change of physicians that you've not previously discussed as this is a common tactic)

8. WC-200(b) -- Request for Change in Authorized Treating Physicians
a. A party must respond to any request for change in treating physician on a WC-200(b) within fifteen (15) days of date printed on certificate of service;
b. An Employer must advise Insurer and legal counsel of receipt of WC-200(b) immediately upon receipt of same.

9. WC-240 -- Light Duty Return to Work Offer (See above-listed previous discussion)

10. WC-243 -- Reduction in Benefits (O.C.G.A. § 34-9-243)
a. Used to take credit for money paid by salary continuation plan, unemployment or disability plan;
b. Advise Insurer of other income replacement payments made;
c. Determine percentage of premium paid by Employer for each applicable plan;
d. Multiply percentage of premium paid by employer against weekly benefit received under plan;
e. Determine period of payment;
f. Take credit for amount paid weekly against amounts due weekly for TTD or TPD (cannot take credit for these wage replacement against PPD rating that might be due); and
g. File form with State Board of Workers’ Compensation at least ten (10) days prior to any hearing.

11. Notice of Hearing -- The Employer must immediately notify Insurer and retain counsel within twenty-one (21) days of hearing notice being issued by State Board of Workers’ Compensation. (Board Rule 102(1)(3).

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Friday, November 16, 2012

How to Calculate WC Benefits



The doctrine of concurrent similar employment is not found in the statute which sets forth the method of calculating disability benefits, O.C.G.A. §34-9-260. It is instead a creation of the State Board of Worker's Compensation through Board Rule 260. It is the State Board's recognition that the effects of a work-related injury may extend beyond that job on which the claimant was working at the time of injury. Board Rule 260 (c) provides that the wages of an employees concurrent similar employment shall be included in the calculation of average weekly wage.

In those instances where the employee is entitled to the maximum compensation rate, inclusion of the wages of the similar employment will make no difference in the amount of compensation to be paid. It may, however, make a very large difference in the duration of income benefits since the average weekly wage is higher and may result in an entitlement to temporary partial disability benefits as long as the work restrictions continue. (Remember, if there are no restrictions, there is no entitlement to TPD regardless of the income differential.) If you have included the wages from the other employ in the average weekly wage, you may suspend benefits based on an actual return to work if the employee returns to the other job regardless of his actions pertaining to his employment on your job. If however, you have not included the other wages in the computation of the average weekly wage, you may not so suspend benefits since, by your calculation, you have admitted/contended that the employ while concurrent, was dissimilar. Therefore, if the determination of whether concurrent employment is similar or dissimilar, you should consider: 1) what effect the wages will have on the compensation rate (i.e. whether the claimant is already eligible for the maximum amount); 2) the likelihood of the claimant becoming entitled to long-term entitlement to TPD; 3) whether the claimant will likely be able to return to the other job but not yours; and 4) whether the calculation could result in a windfall to the claimant on PPD benefits which would not be recoverable elsewhere.

Careful consideration should be given to exactly what employment would constitute concurrent similar employment. You should weigh not only the job titles but also their relative duties for any similarities. Be mindful of the fact that the State Board will likely want to broadly construe or emphasize the similarities (with the resulting de-emphasizing of differences) in order to afford higher income benefits to a legitimately injured employee.


ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 640, 258 SE 2d 293 (1979). Court held that claimant's work as a machinist was not similar to his supervisory work in his water purification business. Since this was not concurrent similar employ, the fact that the claimant performed this while on TTD would not authorize employer to suspend benefits.

Employer's Insurance of Wausau et al. v. Brown et al, 147 Ga. App. 866, 250 SE 2d 575 (1978). Employee killed while working for independent contractor cutting trees with chainsaw for pulpwood. Other employ was as a "slasher operator" cutting up whole trees. Court found that concurrent employ was similar in that both involved risk, required skill and both used in the pulpwood industry.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company et al. v. Walters, 141 Ga. App. 579, 234 SE 2d 157 (1977). Claimant was employed part-time as retail sales clerk by family store having only two employees. Injured while doing full-time job as a clerk for a hospital. Court held that since both jobs involved handling of money, giving receipts, keeping records and meeting the public, employment was similar. Court declined to find employment dissimilar based simply on the fact that the part-time work was not covered under the WC act.


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Wednesday, November 14, 2012

New Case - Change of condition v. New Accident

The difficult task of discerning between what facts constitute a change of condition and those which show a new accident were once again the subject of a Georgia Court of Appeals decision issued yesterday 11/13/12.  The Court handed down its opinion in the case of Evergreen Packaging, Inc et al. v. Prather (Ga Ct App A12a1067).  Briefly, the facts are that Larry Prather was working as a warehouseman and forklift driver for Evergreen when he injured his back in 2002.  As a result of that injury, he was paid 5 weeks of income benefits, received medical treatment and returned to work.  In 2005-2006, Prather applied for and was granted a change in his job duties.  His new job as "plate maker"(he made plates for Evergreen's printing presses and cleaned them after the process was completed) required him to gather materials, cut those materials and to handle the plates which weighed between 15-20# for a set of 4 plates.   The process also required him to place the plates in numbered bins which required bending over all the way to the floor and reaching up over his head.  In addition, the new position also required lifting boxes weighing between 30-50#.  Prather admitted that the lifting required in new position was lighter than the lifting requirements in his position as a warehouseman. 

According to Prather, after his return to work from the initial injury, his back (which bothered him from day one) got progressivley worse.  Prather was unable to point to any specific incident where he actually felt that he hurt himself.  From his return to work after the 2002 unjury until 2010, he missed one week of work due to back problems.

During his last two years of employment, Evergreen purchased a new plate table for Prather to use.  This new table required him to bend over farther in performing his duties and this activity caused his back condition to worsen.  Over the last few months of his employment, he noticed new symptoms  (a numbing feeling down into his foot).  Prather south treatment on 2/3/10 with a chiropractor and on 3/1/10 stopped working at the recommendation of another chiropractor.  A new MRI was obtained on 3/15/10 which, when compared with the previous MRI in 2005 showed an increase in the extent of disc extrusion and an increase in stenosis.  An annular tear was also noted as a new finding on the 2010 report. 

With no specific injury noted and with work lifting requirements in the new employment being lighter than in his old job, it would seem that this case was tailor-made for a change of condition finding.  Readers of this blog will recall previous posts in which the case of Central State Hospital v. James,  147 Ga. App 308, 248 SE 2d 678 (1978) was discussed (probably at too much length).  The James court explained the possible permutations in a given factual scenario as the basis for the analyzing whether a change of condition or a new accident should be found.   Evergreen argued that the first scenario discussed in James was directly applicable and required the change of condtion finding since the condition deteriorated, there was no specific incident or new injury precipitating that decline and because the job duties were lighter.  They argued that, as a matter of law, these facts required a finding of a change of condition.

The Court in Prather, however, decided that the ALJ, the SBWC's Appellate Division and the Superior Court, had it right in deciding that the claimant aggravated his condition, a fictional new injury, as a consequence of his job duties. The Court pointed to the 1980 decision in Certain v. USF&G, 153 Ga App 571, 266, SE 2d 263(1980) which provided that "ordinarily the distinguishing feature which will characterize the disability as either a change of condition or new accident is the intervention of new circumstances."  Since in Mr. Prather's case the SBWC had found such new circumstances in the new plate table that Prather used which required him to bend over farther in performing his duties and that this activity caused his back condition to worsen.  With this finding, there was evidence to support the award of the SBWC (finding a new injury) and thus, the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals were duty-bound to affirm it.

What were pivotal pieces of evidence?   1) new findings on the MRI - in particular the annular tear 2) the Plate table which required more bending over and which made the condition worse.  Other items of concern, which Evergreen and its attorneys could do precious little to combat were: a) the change of condition statute of limitations had run on the old claim so if Mr. Prather were provided medical under the old claim, he would have no income during the convalescence and b) the claimant and the medical providers were pushing for the new accident.   Motivation of the employee is an important consideration when analyzing these claims.  Getting the employee on your side early on may help sway the medical providers as well.  This is critical, especially when there is a new carrier or new employer involved.




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Tuesday, November 13, 2012

My Employee got an attorney for his work comp claim! Why?

My Employee got an attorney!  Why? 

 http://youtu.be/oUulWBv3Pro


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Returning to Work

One’s view of a light duty return to work program very often depends upon the perspective from which you start. The insurance company or third-party administrative agency looks upon the return to work effort as an opportunity to suspend the employee’s income benefits and hopefully move that claim toward closure. The employer, on the other hand, looks upon a light duty return to work program with trepidation and with legitimate concern as to how this return to work will affect not only that employee’s individual workers’ compensation claim but also over the financial and administrative headaches occasioned by providing restricted duty. The employee’s concern, on yet another hand, has elements of both the insurance company and the employer but very often from a different angle. Depending on the presentation, the employee can view the return to work effort as simply an attempt to get him off of benefits and to force him into a position where he performs menial tasks for which he will be looked down upon by his co-employees.

For these reasons, light duty return to work programs can be a mine field which, if improperly navigated, can explode into a situation worse than had the return to work effort not been made. It is our hope, through this discussion, that we can provide a guide to navigate an employee from income benefits to productive and useful employment.

For purposes of this discussion, we are assuming a compensable injury with ongoing and legitimate restrictions. If your employee has no restrictions from the authorized treating physician, then you are not required to provide light duty employment. Instead, that employee is in the same position as every other member of the general workforce and is required to "work for his supper."


A. Reasons for Return to WorkThe most optimistic reason to return an injured employee to work is the hope that doing so will foster a healthy work environment for not only the injured employee but for other employees as well. An employer’s willingness to "take care of its own" can, if handled properly, produce loyal employees who do not blame the employer for an on-the-job injury. Further, this employer can be seen as protecting its employees from economic hardship occasioned by the acceptance of income benefits. While many of us sometimes view an employee as being anxious for the "free ride" of indemnity benefits, the reality is that Georgia provides one of the lowest income benefit levels in the country. For this reason, many employees can see a dramatic difference between the TTD benefits which they receive and the net pay to which they have become accustomed from full-time work. TTD is not, therefore, a great bargain for the employee. Employers should use this fact to their advantage by convincing the injured employee that productivity is beneficial not only to the employer but also to the employee whose bills and expenses do not decrease simply by the occurrence of a work-related injury.
Equally as important, but more often the selling point to employers is the dramatic cost savings which can be realized if light duty work is routinely made available. An employee who is allowed to languish out of work costs the employer both indemnity benefits and medical benefits. The employee who is allowed to "sit at home" has more time to focus on his injury thereby providing potential for the perceived need for additional treatment in order to achieve the "cure" which may not even be possible. Furthermore, the idle employee, focusing on continued pain and problems, is also concerned about financial stability and egotistical factors like the inability to adequately provide for his family. This situation leads either to actual depression or complaints of depression which may later require psychological/psychiatric intervention to cope with the pressures of being out of work.
Much as athletes can be injured when returning to their sports from off-season vacations, employees are more susceptible to re-injury and complaints of pain after returning to the workforce from extended periods of disability. Very often, employers and insurers dismiss an injured employee’s complaints after a brief return to work period as simple whining. However, the possibility exists that the employee is simply deconditioned. The employee, in addition to dealing with the after effects of a work-related injury, is also beginning to reuse muscles not particularly exercised during extended periods with a recliner and a remote control. The best way to stop this "deconditioning" is to prevent the employee from becoming or remaining idle for extended periods of time.
Another equally legitimate reason to keep an employee from extended periods of disability is the "Oprah mentality" that sometimes arises when an injured employee is subjected to too much day-time television. In addition to the mind-numbing effects of the programming itself, the employee is exposed to numerous attorney and chiropractic commercials which instill or reinforce the notion that the employer is not out for the employee’s interests. This then translates into the employer’s problem with increased indemnity, medical and settlement costs as well as possible litigation costs.
Oftentimes, the employer and not the employee provides the first impediment to an employee’s return to work. We must diligently guard against the idea that workers’ compensation claimants are necessarily bad employees. While this may sometimes be true, the State Board of Workers’ Compensation is dubious of such claims and very often views such assertions as retaliation for filing the workers’ compensation claim. Before accepting this assertion from the employer, ask: "does the personnel file support the idea that this employee was a non-productive employee with poor performance, attitude or punctuality?" An employer that constantly finds reasons to terminate employees with workers’ compensation claims may find, too late, that it has developed a reputation with the State Board of Workers’ Compensation for not taking care of its employees.
For the true "problem employee," not giving a return to work option through a light duty work program gives the employee exactly what that employee wants. The employer’s refusal to provide light duty work surrenders control of the claim to the employee resulting in an exponential increase in the cost of the claim.
Oftentimes, the employer views a light duty work program as an opportunity to set a bad example for other employees. Whether the bad example be from the injured employee’s spreading of gossip such as "I’m going to own this company" or the injured employee getting paid the same amount for less work duties, employers often assume that the best way to prevent this bad influence from spreading is to remove the employee from the company. Once again, however, this cedes control of the claim to the employee and removes a great deal of flexibility in handling the workers’ compensation claim by the employer and insurer. Furthermore, simply removing the employee from the company does not cut the employee’s lifeline to his co-employees nor either does removal of the employee move the claim toward resolution.
The most common objection a light duty return to work request is the perceived lack of such work by the employer. Many times, the employer simply has not looked. Analyzing the legitimate job functions which have to be performed and determining whether any can be performed by an employee with physical restrictions very often reveals the availability of some work which can be performed by the claimant. The employer should be encouraged to look for opportunities to make a light duty job offer, not for reasons to refuse it.

B. Elements of a Return to Work Program
The most important component of any return to work is cooperation from the authorized treating physician. Medical approval of a light duty job is a necessary component to the employee’s return to work effort. Theoretically, the employer will choose physicians for inclusion on its panel that are familiar with the workers’ compensation process and that show a willingness to consider a return to work as therapeutic to the employee. To maintain control of the medical treatment rendered to your employees, a panel of physicians must be properly composed, posted and utilized. The panel must also be properly posted to assure that employees have knowledge of the panel and how it is to be used in connection with work-related injuries.
Whenever an employee is sent to the authorized treating physician for medical treatment, the employer should advise the physician to consider appropriate restrictions and that the restrictions will be accommodated by the employer. Do not allow the employee the freedom to tell the authorized treating physician that the employer has no light duty work; that unrefuted point will result in a disability slip from the doctor’s office.
The next essential element in the return to work program is the employer: the employer must have the proper attitude with regard to light duty work efforts. First, the employer must be patient in pursuing the medical opinion and providing the necessary documentation of the employer’s actual job opportunities. The employer must also be patient with the employee and not allow the employee’s bitterness, trepidation, or whining to scuttle the return to work effort.
The employer must scrupulously observe all Board rules as technical deficiencies in the employer’s filings will thwart return to work efforts. When the job description is submitted to the authorized treating physician for approval, the employer must also send a copy of the job description to the claimant or claimant’s counsel. Once the job description is approved by the authorized treating physician, the employer must send a WC-240 to the employee (regardless of the date of accident) advising the employee of the specific job being tendered, the approval of that job by the authorized treating physician as well as the date, time and location on which the employee is to report for duty. The employee must be provided 10 days notice If the employee does not successfully remain at work for 15 business days (note: this is not 15 calendar days), then the employer must recommence income benefits regardless of whether the employee’s attempt at the job was sincere. Lame attempt at return to work efforts are issues for litigation--not for hardball tactics. Patience at this juncture is essential since refusal to recommence income benefits will result in a waiver of the employer’s defense that the job was, in fact, suitable.
The final link in the light duty return to work program over which the employer has any measure of control is the job itself. The employer should look to the essential functions of the employee’s regular job to determine whether the employee can perform those functions with or without accommodation. If so, a return to work effort is easier to contemplate. Written job descriptions are helpful in this regard in that they quickly provide information to the authorized treating physician for approval or modification.
If, on the other hand, the employee’s regular job is beyond the employee’s light duty restrictions, then consideration of other positions should be made. Simply put, is there another job for which the employee is otherwise qualified which that employee could perform with reasonable accommodations? It is not necessary for the employer to create a job for the employee.
Some consideration should be given to consulting with the injured employee to determine whether there is any job available which the employee could perform with or without accommodation. Note, if this analysis sounds similar to the ADA considerations, it is. In fact, your light duty return to work program may be your best defense against an ADA claim by establishing, through example, the employer does not discriminate against individuals based upon physical restrictions or handicaps.
An indispensable outside source of assistance for your light duty return to work program is vocational rehabilitation. Vocational rehabilitation expertise can be utilized either with or without permission from the claimant or claimant’s counsel.
With permission of the claimant or the claimant’s counsel, vocational rehabilitation can be an invaluable service both within or outside the company. For return to work efforts within the company, vocational assistance can provide a detailed analysis of each distinct job function, job movement and requirement. Such information is usually very helpful in explaining to the authorized treating physician exactly what motions and duties are required in the job which the claimant is expected to perform. For those return to work efforts outside the employ, vocational assistance can locate employment elsewhere that it is suitable for the employee’s restricted capacity.
Without the consent of the claimant or the claimant’s counsel, however, rehabilitation efforts are severely limited. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1 and Board Rule 200.1 have been construed by the State Board of Workers’ Compensation to subject rehabilitation suppliers to civil penalties for consulting with a physician about an injured employee even without contact with the injured employee.
Even without permission of the claimant or claimant’s counsel, vocational rehabilitation can assist the employer in identifying light duty positions, describing light duty positions or modifying existing positions to qualify them as suitable light duty employment. That expertise can be drawn upon for the purpose of preparing a report which the adjuster, the employer or the employer’s counsel can then utilize in direct contact with the authorized treating physician. This contact (by the employer, the insurance adjuster or defense counsel) cannot be restricted by claimant’s counsel and does not violate the claimant’s privacy interests. Use of rehabilitation suppliers in advance of an injury to prepare job descriptions for all available jobs within the employer’s business may be a good idea in that it will provide a quick reference which the employer can provide to the authorized treating physician for consideration and approval. This alone can limit disability exposure on present and future claims. Some employers have even taken the extraordinary step of providing a notebook of all job opportunities to their panel physicians so that the physicians are aware of the job performed by the claimant and the physical requirements of that job. Furthermore, having job descriptions readily available to the authorized treating physician provides the advantage of giving a panel provider the opportunity to consider a return to work while the employee is fresh in their mind rather than relying on vague recollections prompted by cryptic notes in the employee’s medical chart.

C. Types of Return to Work Programs
Within the structure of the physical restrictions imposed upon the employee by the authorized treating physician, light duty return to work is really only limited by your imagination. A successful transition between injury and productive employment is, however, fostered by the employer’s attitude in providing employment that constitutes a legitimate business necessity. In other words, if the job looks like it is "make-work," the employee has less incentive to perform that job, and the State Board of Workers’ Compensation has less reason to consider the job legitimate and to force the employee to perform it.
The entire reason for considering the light duty return to work of your injured employees is to maintain control of your workers’ compensation claims thereby keeping their costs down. The maximum control and flexibility which the employer can possess in return to work efforts is to bring the employee back to work within the employer’s business. It necessarily follows, then, that return to work efforts outside the employer’s business provide the least amount of control and least amount of flexibility. Each return to work option requires medical support and employer patience. Not every option is available in every circumstance nor will every option be ideal for every given case.
D. Return to Work within the Employer’s BusinessThe thing to remember with this return to work program is that YOU ARE IN CONTROL. While the employer may have concerns regarding the injured employee’s performance or attitude after a return to work, the employer can, through creativity and patience, prevent a bad attitude from blossoming into an unsuccessful return to work attempt.
The best option for the injured employee’s return to work is to attempt a return to the employee’s own job. The job cannot be then considered "make-work"; there is less down time for training and a quicker return to normalcy than under any other possible job opportunity. The employer should maintain flexibility in that return to work effort and consider possible reductions in the job duties if certain non-essential functions are outside the employee’s restrictions. If the employee’s job is not immediately suitable, minor modifications may make it so. If the essential functions of the job are still beyond the employee’s restrictions, the employer should consider other available work.
The advantage to bringing the employee back to work within the employer’s company is primarily control. The employer can, through use of the WC-240, force the employee into at least attempting the return to work effort under penalty of unilateral suspension of the employee’s benefits. As mentioned, this does require patience since the employee has the 15-day grace period during which he may attempt to do the job without sacrificing his right to income benefits. By a return to work within the employer’s own business, either at the same job or a new task, the employer prevents the employee from "passive/aggressive" or even "aggressive/aggressive" control: with the job, the employer does not pay workers’ compensation benefits. Patience, and even a little Valium, will help the employer during the often difficult transition from disability to productivity. By controlling the employer’s behavior, the employer has the opportunity to monitor the employee. Even if the return to work is unsuccessful, the employer will have first hand knowledge of the employee’s actions, efforts and any conversation which may have occurred.
The return to work within the employer’s own business is the least expensive alternative of all return to work options. Generally, if the employer can successfully return the employer to his regular job either with or without removal of non-essential duties, little expense is incurred.
E. Funded Employment If a return to work within the employer’s business is not possible, desirable or feasible, some consideration should be given to funding employment with another business. In essence, funded employment is an agreement by the employer to expend a certain amount of money to place an employee, permanently or temporarily, with another business. While this approach seemingly has the advantage of getting rid of "your problem", in some circumstances the employer would be responsible for the employee (for insurance, workers’ compensation exposures and the like) while still covering some of the expenses of that injured employee’s work with the other company.
Flexibility is necessarily limited by the pool of jobs available in the market. These outside sources may not have the incentive to modify existing employment to meet the individual employee’s needs. However, oftentimes these businesses have some advantage in flexibility in that the work to be performed is often a business need which is being unmet because of funding shortages.
Control in funded employment is maintained but with less certainty than is available for a return to the employer’s own business. The employer can still utilize the WC-240 procedure and its accompanying unilateral benefits suspension rights. As the employee is, however, reporting to work for a different organization, the employer has less control over the return to work circumstance and the response of the business who is receiving the gift of an employee. It is not hard to imagine that an employee who is less than excited about a return to work will make a less than diligent or sincere effort to attempt that job. Employees can use subtle ways of scuttling a job interview or return to work effort through poor punctuality, appearance, demeanor or behavior. The business receiving this "funded employee’ is then left with the choice of whether to hire this person with the bad attitude rather than other employees who might be available. On the other hand, the outside source for employment is not emotionally involved in the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim and may, therefore, present less of a target for the employee. Also, with no financial stake in the claim, the potential receiving employer may be willing to exercise some degree of patience in making the return to work effort successful.
One such example is returning the employee to work with a charitable organization. In this case, flexibility is enhanced and creativity is almost limitless. One such funded employment proposal, which turned out to be successful, is the example of a construction worker who sustained a closed head injury on the job. While that employee did not have a great deal of transferable skills, he did have knowledge of the construction industry and was able to work as a supervisor for Habitat for Humanity. Habitat for Humanity, a charitable organization which builds houses for those who might not otherwise be able to afford them, utilizes the services of volunteers who oftentimes do not have a great deal of construction experience. Habitat for Humanity was so impressed by this injured worker’s supervisory skills that it expressed an interest in hiring him as a regular paid employee. While most efforts to utilize funded employment with charitable organizations will not be as successful, many efforts will bring about settlement of a workers’ compensation claim if the employee is convinced that the employer is willing to pay to make that employee work. Further, by these efforts, the employee’s benefits are suspended with the eventual expiration of the change of condition statute of limitations.
The expense for this charity employment may not present a dramatic increase in the expenses already being incurred by the employer. The employer is already paying temporary total disability benefits to the claimant, but it may receive good will in the community as well as tax deductions by paying this employee to work for a charity. In a successful situation, the return to work can lead to medical improvement (less focus on the symptoms and treatment) as well as possible settlement of the claim.
Other examples of outside employment opportunities include such opportunities as the Expediter program and other community rehab facilities. The Expediter program, described more fully in the literature at Appendix A, a separate company which utilizes workers with handicaps or physical injuries to perform telephone-related work from the employee’s home. The employee is not paid for telephone solicitation work and, is instead, commonly utilized for telephone surveys regarding consumer products or consumer services. While the cost of this program is certainly not negligible, approximately $4,000.00, the cost can be of significant benefit if it produces a successful return to work or an incentive for the employee to settle the workers’ compensation claim. The Expediter program also provides the advantage of more control through continued utilization of a WC-240 and of having the injured employee become the employee of a separate business. This work, a legitimate business necessity, is not "make-work" and would provide a realistic job opportunity. The claimant would then be forced to argue that he is better off collecting temporary total disability benefits than performing some work for an outside business. If the injured employee is accepted into the Expeditor program, an actual job offer is made (assuming medical support can be obtained) and the WC-240 can be use.
Also available for outside employment possibilities are community rehabilitation facilities such as those included on the list attached at Appendix B. These facilities are generally state agency resources that provide opportunities for sheltered employment or vocational assistance. The community rehabilitation facilities sacrifice some degree of control. The community facilities are "programs of choice" and are not available as a method to force the employee into doing something contrary to his wishes. However, if the employee is willing to consider the facilities, sheltered employment (some work while directly employed with the facility) can be made available on a limited basis. More likely, vocational assistance is provided: preparation of a resume, job skill assessments and identification of other employment. These community rehabilitation facilities cost too.

F. Employment Data Companies
Other possibilities for return to work efforts, of recent advent, are employment data companies. These companies, pioneered by Claimant Employment Services, provide data regarding available job opportunities in the injured employee’s community.
The advantage to employment data companies is that they can provide a larger pool of potential jobs. The employer is not simply limited to his own business or the resources of which that employer has knowledge. However, employment data companies cannot offer control to the employer as the information provided is only that of available job opportunities and not an actual job offer which can be the basis for a utilization of the WC-240. Further, the employer cannot force an employee to use the data or to apply for any of the job opportunities.
Employment data companies are, however, ideally suited for use as evidence in litigation. For example, under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6), an employee can seek catastrophic designation for his injury and use as evidence an order from the Social Security Administration granting disability income benefits. While this evidence is not conclusive as to the catastrophic nature of the employee’s injury under the Workers’ Compensation Act, it is very often strong evidence. The basis of the Social Security Administration’s finding of disability is that the employee is disabled not only from his own occupation but also from other occupations available in substantial numbers in the national economy. Employment data companies provide data about employment opportunities not just in the national economy but in the employee’s immediate locale. While we cannot compel the employee to seek any job opportunities presented by the employment data company, evidence that suitable light duty employment is available to the employee may combat a request for catastrophic designation. As you may recall, the catastrophic designation prohibits the employer from utilizing the WC-104 to limit the employee’s receipt of temporary total disability benefits while the employee has light duty restrictions.

G. Conclusion
The only limitation to the employer’s return to work efforts is the employer’s imagination and capacity for patience. The more flexible the employer can be, the more control that can be achieved. If the employer has maintained control of the workers’ compensation claim, nine times out of ten, the claim is less expensive and of shorter duration.


"Skedsvold & White
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